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Abstract
This paper applies the multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) contagion test, as proposed by Dungey et al. (2004), to detect conta-
gion e↵ects in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Mone-
tary System (EMS). Crisis and non-crisis observations are determined endoge-
nously via a Markov-switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR). We show
that the MS-VAR is suitable for this purpose, as it does particularly well in
identifying the 11 realignments of the ERM. We examine whether Denmark’s
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and Italy’s competitiveness problems af-
fected other EMS participants and find evidence for contagion.
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1 Introduction
Despite the apparent stability of the international monetary system since the early
1990s, often attributed to the adoption of more flexible exchange rate regimes and
inflation targeting (see, e.g. Rose, 2007), few would argue that currency crises are
a thing of the past. In fact, for the period 1973-97 Bordo et al. (2001) find that
the frequency of currency crises was higher than in the preceding post-war period.
More recently, the crises of Argentina in 2001 and Brazil in 2002 served as useful,
but costly, reminders of the dire consequences of failing to recognize the dangers of
capital flight. As policymakers have tried to steer clear of such e↵ects there has,
indeed, been a move towards more flexible exchange rate systems. But this trend is
not universal: excluding 41 countries that do not have a separate legal tender, 75
countries still operate some form of peg compared to 76 running an independent or
managed float.1
The theoretical literature has grown and evolved to o↵er various explanations for
the apparently ever-changing crisis phenomena. The initial approach of unsustain-
able monetary fundamentals (see Krugman, 1979) was followed by game-theoretic
models with multiple equilibria (see Obstfeld, 1986). The latter predict that cir-
cumstances can arise in which investors’ perception of a government’s objectives
can lead to a crisis even when the fundamentals are in order. More recently, and
as a result of the inability of existing models to predict the Asian crisis, so called
third generation models evolved. These explain crises in terms of moral hazard and
contagion e↵ects and highlight the role of banking supervision (see, e.g. Corsetti et
al., 1999).
In this paper, we propose a Markov regime-switching methodology to model
movements in the foreign exchange (FX) markets and their transmission across
countries. Such models have been extensively used in the business cycle literature
(see, e.g. Hamilton, 1989 and Krolzig, 2001, among others) and, more recently, in
1See the IMF’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy framework
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706.htm (as of July 31st, 2006).
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currency crisis research. A crisis can be thought of as a switch from a state of the
world with zero or negative FX market pressure (a ‘tranquil’ regime) to one where the
pressure is positive and higher (a ‘crisis’ regime). In other words, there are jumps in
the mean and –depending on the setting– changes in the volatility of the time series
across di↵erent regimes. We apply this methodology to the European Monetary
System (EMS). In our setting three phases of the EMS are captured accurately: the
‘old’ EMS when several realignments took place, the ‘new’ EMS when there were no
adjustments of the exchange rate bands and the final stage characterized by extreme
FX pressure that culminated in the abandonment of the mechanism.
Our approach is simple and intuitive and does not require the a priori break-
down of the sample into crisis and non-crisis periods. Crisis periods are endogenously
determined. Adopting this methodology has the advantage that it enables us to cal-
culate the probabilities of a shift between the two regimes, as well as their duration.
Hence, we obtain a measure of how crisis-prone the EMS was.
Moreover, the use of a FX pressure index enables us to focus on spillovers in the
FX market. The MS-VAR allows us to answer the question of whether correlations
between countries vary across regimes. We focus further on the question of contagion
by using the Dungey et al. (2004) multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) formula to test explicitly for changes in market linkages. We find evidence
that volatility transmission is ‘over and above’ what would be explained by the
transmission mechanism that prevails during tranquil periods. Subject to some
caveats, which we discuss in a later section, this constitutes evidence of ‘contagion’
e↵ects.
2 Contagion in the Literature
The exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system came to life in
March 1979 in order to reduce the exchange rate volatility between the (then) Euro-
pean Economic Community members’ currencies. Its main feature was that fluctu-
ations in bilateral exchange rates, expressed in ECU (the European Currency Unit
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–a precursor of the Euro), should be contained within a ±2.25 percent band around
a central parity.2 A series of realignments (18 in total)3 and general instability
eventually led to the widening of the band to ±15 percent in August 2003.4
In this paper we explore potential contagion e↵ects within the ERM mechanism.
But what constitutes contagion? A loose interpretation of the term would include
the simple transmission of shocks from one country to another through existing
economic channels (e.g. the current account). This is the point of view taken
in Eichengreen et al. (1996). Using a panel of quarterly data (1959-93) for 20
developed economies they find that the probability of a crisis increases significantly
as a result of a crisis occurring somewhere else. The channels put forward as potential
transmitters of shocks are trade links and comparable macroeconomic policies and
conditions. Both are found to be significant factors in the propagation of shocks
across countries, with the trade e↵ect being stronger. The caveat issued by the
authors is that common shocks may be another driving influence for the results
even though, clearly, it is not the only one.
Further evidence on the trade link is provided by Glick and Rose (1999). Using
cross-sectional data for five di↵erent crisis incidents (the Bretton Woods demise in
1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1973, the EMS crisis in 1992-93,
the Mexican crisis in 1994-95 and the Asian crisis in 1997-98) they find that the
trade channel is important either through direct trade between countries or through
trade competition for the same markets. Specifically, their direct trade variable is
defined as
DirectTradei = 1  |xi0   x0i|
xi0 + x0i
,
with exports x and countries i and 0, whereas the trade linkage variable is measured
2The exception was Italy, whose currency had a wider band of ±6 percent.
3The precise dates of these realignments are: 24 September 1979, 30 November 1979, 23 March
1981, 5 October 1981, 22 February 1982, 14 June 1982, 21 March 1983, 18 May 1983, 22 July 1985,
7 April 1986, 4 August 1986, 12 January 1987, 8 January 1990, 14 September 1992, 17 September
1992, 23 November 1992, 1 January 1993 and 14 May 1993. On 3 August 1993 the exchange rate
bands widened. Source: Eurostat.
4With the exception of Germany and the Netherlands that maintained the narrower bands for
the Mark and the Guilder, respectively.
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as
Tradei =
Xx0k + xk0
x0 + xi
⇥
✓
1  xik   x0k
xik + x0k
◆ 
,
with xik denoting bilateral exports from country i to k and xi being overall exports
of country i. Country 0 is the first victim (or “ground zero”, as the authors call
it) of a crisis: Germany for the first two crises examined and Finland, Mexico and
Thailand for the remaining three, respectively. The key finding is that an increase
in any of the trade variables corresponds to a significant increase in the probability
of a crisis in the EMS.
A stricter definition of contagion would not encompass a propagation of shocks
through real channels that remain unchanged during di↵erent states of the world.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) concentrate on the change in cross-market linkages fol-
lowing a country-specific shock. In other words, if any real linkages existed prior
to the shock and remained unaltered during and after it, then any increased cor-
relation between asset prices (e.g. stock prices) is not evidence of contagion from
one market to the other, just interdependence. If, however, there is a significant
change in these linkages, the term contagion (or shift contagion) can be used. This
distinction is justified as during calm periods exchange rates are normally driven by
fundamentals, whereas during crisis periods investor confidence/psychology takes
over. Focusing on European money markets Favero and Giavazzi (2002) confirm
that non-linearities were present (“a general phenomenon”) in the propagation of
shocks in the EMS.
The Markov-switching framework is ideal to examine the change in correlations
across di↵erent states of the world, in this case crisis and non-crisis ones. The
idea of having discrete random changes in regime modeled as a Markov chain is
straightforward. An N -state Markov chain can be described by P{rt = k|rt 1 =
j, rt 2 = i, ...} = P{rt = k|rt 1 = j} = pjk, where rt is a random variable taking
values 1, 2, ..., N . This process implies that rt depends only on the most recent
value rt 1; in other words, previous states do not a↵ect the current state.5 There
5See Krolzig (1997), chapters 1 and 2 and Hamilton (1994), chapter 22, for a detailed statistical
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are several examples of studies of currency or financial crises in a Markov-switching
autoregressive framework; see, e.g. Amato and Tronzano (2000), Martinez-Peria
(2002), Cerra and Saxena (2002) and Abiad (2003). In contrast, there are very few
examples that have used this framework to study contagion explicitly.6 Two such
examples are Billio et al. (2005) and Gravelle et al. (2006).
In the first of these papers, Billio et al. (2005) examine the Asian crisis. The
main arguments put forward for the use of regime switching are similar to those
we employ; namely: (i) the endogenous selection of crisis and non-crisis periods
alleviates the need for a priori categorization of observations into any of these two
categories, and (ii) the correlations are conditioned on each regime and, hence,
facilitate the analysis of market linkages. The main finding is that there is evidence
of interdependence but not contagion from Hong Kong to the European and U.S.
stock markets in 1997. In the second paper, Gravelle et al. (2006) concentrate on
Latin America. Their findings suggest that shocks are transmitted through long-run
real links even though there is some evidence that short-term e↵ects are present in
periods of high turbulence.
Here, we advance this agenda exploring contagion in the ERM by applying
the multivariate version of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), described in Dungey et al.
(2004).
3 More on the MSVAR
The behavior of market correlations across crisis and non-crisis regimes is of interest
to policymakers who may use the past as a guide to what to expect during periods of
turmoil. It is also of interest to FX investors. For example, currencies whose returns
are uncorrelated during good times but tend to synchronize during bad times will
not o↵er the expected diversification benefits when these would be needed the most.
review of Markov chains and their use in regime switching models.
6Of course, there is a sizeable applied literature of contagion tests using alternative methodolo-
gies; see, e.g. Billio and Pelizzon (2003), Baur and Fry (2006) and Fazio (2007).
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From this paper’s point of view, we aim to build a parsimonious specification that
describes the ERM experience accurately and identifies correctly most realignments
as crisis periods. We achieve this by opting for a two-regime setting without fun-
damentals for our analysis. The realistic behavior of the model allows us to use the
resulting classification of observations across the two regimes to conduct the Dungy
et al. (2004) multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test –henceforth
FRM.
The choice of the number of regimes entails a degree of subjectivity, as the
literature raises several caveats against applying particular statistical criteria.7 Our
choice of two regimes is consistent with the criterion of parsimony given that the
available degrees of freedom decline fast when adding parameters for estimation to a
vector autoregressive framework. Moreover, modeling the process with two-regimes
is intuitive for an ERM application given that the data show the prevalence of
either a tranquil state with relative stability (or moderate tendencies for exchange
rate appreciation) or a turbulent crisis state with strong depreciating pressures. Our
estimates are consistent with this observation. On the downside, an implication of
this assumption is that there are no permanent shifts of regime, as the model always
reverts to the non-crisis state.
The decision to undertake the analysis within a static framework without fun-
damentals is also important. Implicitly, the assumption is that the probability of
switching from one state to another is not a↵ected by exogenous variables. This does
not pose a problem for the purpose of this paper, which is to analyze state-dependent
correlations and to explore whether shifts can be attributed to contagion. So called
time-varying transition probability (TVTP) models allow for fundamentals at the
cost of greater complication.8 The choice of exogenous variables in such a setting is
7For example, Psaradakis et al. (2003) find evidence that the Akaike Information Criterion is a
reasonable guide to regime number selection but they confirm this only for autoregressive processes
where the autoregressive parameter is known, and the change in parameters and sample are not
too small. Overall, they argue that the so called three pattern method is probably the best, under
these assumptions.
8See Filardo (1994) for details of the Bayesian estimation.
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crucial and would go beyond our modest goals. It is also a possibility that market
sentiment may drive changes in correlations, especially during turmoil in the FX
market. For example King et al. (1995) argue that “changes in correlations across
markets are driven primarily by unobservable variables”.
4 The Data
The FX pressure measure we use is a market pressure indicator (MPI) in the spirit of
Eichengreen et al. (1996). The index consists of time series on the nominal exchange
rate change against the Deutsche Mark (XR), the change in the interest rate di↵er-
ential with Germany (IRD), and the change in foreign exchange reserves (RES) –in
US Dollars.9 A market pressure index is a superior measure to one based on simple
nominal exchange rates, as it captures all pressure in the foreign exchange market,
including unsuccessful speculative attacks. For example, the monetary authorities
might be able to fend o↵ an attack by raising their policy rate or by buying domestic
currency (and thus spending their international reserves). This activity would not
register in the exchange rate series, but it is evident in the MPI, which is, formally,
expressed as:
MPI = ↵XR +  IRD    RES.
For the XR and RES series percentage changes were created by taking the first
di↵erence of the natural logarithms. For IRD we take the first di↵erence since the
series is already expressed in percentage points. An increase in the value of the
index signifies pressures in the FX market, since a higher nominal exchange rate
implies a depreciation of the domestic currency and higher interest di↵erentials and
reduced reserves show the implementation of defending policies by the central bank.
The minus sign in the equation above ensures that a reduction in reserves translates
9Eichengreen et al. (1996) express reserves as the di↵erence between a country’s percent change
of reserve holdings and Germany’s percent change of reserve holdings. Quantitatively, inclusion of
German reserves does not make a di↵erence to the results, which we report later. German reserves
were the least volatile during the sample period.
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into an increase in the value of the index. The weights ↵,   and   are determined
by applying the following formula:
wi =
✓
1
StDevi
◆
/
✓
1
StDevXR
+
1
StDevIRD
+
1
StDevRES
◆
,
where wi = ↵,  ,  , and i = XR, IRD,RES. StDev stands for the standard devia-
tion.10
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The countries in our sample are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and
the Netherlands. Spain, Portugal and the UK joined the exchange rate mechanism
much later –and with a wider margin of 6% compared to 2.5% for the other members–
and, hence, are not included. In addition, we do not consider countries that had
pegged to the ECU, e.g. Finland and Sweden. With the exception of the first five
observations of the Irish interest rate, and three observations of the French interest
rate data comes from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. The missing
data were taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. The data are monthly
and cover the period January 1978 to December 1993.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all six countries. It can be seen that,
unlike the other countries, the Netherlands index has a negative mean implying that
on average the country did not face severe FX market pressures. The standard devi-
ation of the index is also the lowest in the sample. For this reason the Netherlands is
not included in our estimations.11 Ireland has the highest mean of all the countries
and the most volatile MPI as shown by its standard deviation. However, from the
plots in Figure 1 it can be seen that the rest of the series were also quite volatile,
10The weighting scheme applied here is slightly di↵erent than the one normally seen in the
literature, which simply uses the inverse of the standard deviation of each variable in the index.
Our scheme normalizes this by the sum of the inverses of all standard deviations ensuring that the
weights add up to 100%. The relative weights are identical in the two schemes, as are the overall
properties of the resulting MPIs.
11We do however check all our results by including the Netherlands in the sample. These
estimations are not reported but do not alter our conclusions.
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with intense pressures mounting during 1992. The distributions are not normal –
they are leptokurtic and positively skewed. Jarque-Bera tests reject normality in all
cases. All series are stationary around zero.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Homoscedastic MSVARs
In the analysis that follows, the variance and, hence, the correlations between the
MPIs of the five countries in the dataset are allowed to vary across regimes. This
permits us to test whether the crisis state is associated with increased correlations.
If true, implies the presence of common shocks or interdependence. If, in addition,
the unconditional correlations significantly increase in the crisis state this could be
taken as indication of contagion, assuming that we are correct in our presumption
about the source country.
We begin our analysis with the simplest task of identifying common regime shifts,
i.e. checking whether the indexes respond to common international shocks. This can
be implemented by an MS-VAR with regime shifts in the mean of the MPI. At this
stage we assume homoscedastic errors and ut ⇠ NID(0,⌃). This simple setting will
not produce transition probabilities consistent with the stylized facts, as the crisis
periods are short compared to non-crisis periods. Hence, the restrictive assumption
of heteroscedasticity is relaxed in what follows and the simple, homoscedastic case
is just presented for comparison purposes. The multivariate setting can be formally
expressed as:
!t = µ(rt) +
pX
j=1
Aj(!t j   µ(rt j)) + ut, (1)
where !t =
h
MPIBELt , MPI
DEN
t , MPI
FRA
t , MPI
IRL
t , MPI
ITA
t
i0
,
µ is a regime-dependent mean, the regime vector rt =
h
rt, rt 1, ..., rt p
i0
, ma-
trices A contain estimates of the coe cients of the pth-order autoregression, and ut
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is a gaussian error term. The criteria for lag selection do not deliver a unanimous
verdict. The likelihood ratio test suggests five lags, the final prediction error and the
Akaike statistic (AIC) give two, and the Hannan Quin and Schwarz criteria suggest
a random walk with a drift specification. Given that the AIC is the most power-
ful test our preferred model features two lags.12 Assuming one lag for exposition
purposes, equation (1) has a representation of the form:13
!t = µ(rt) +
1X
j=0
Aj1ut j. (2)
The process can be seen as the sum of common system shocks (µ(rt)) and country-
specific shocks (
P1
j=0A
j
1ut j).
The first panel of Table 2 reports the mean of regime 1 (µ1) and the mean of
regime 2 (µ2) as well as the shift in the mean across the two regimes. Regime 1 is
the tranquil state, where there are either negative pressures on the MPI (implying
appreciating domestic currency or a decrease in the interest rate di↵erential or ac-
cumulation of reserves or a combination of these) or no pressures at all, in which
case the mean is close to zero. A switch to a crisis state is associated with positive
means indicating mounting FX pressures. The di↵erence between the means is in
all cases positive, with Ireland’s shift being the most dramatic.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The transition probabilities estimated using two lags indicate that both regimes
are quite stable. The probability of switching from a tranquil to a crisis state
is 19.9%, whereas the probability of a switch from crisis to tranquility is 24.3%.
The non-varying contemporaneous correlations (as we have assumed homoscedastic
error variances do not change across states of the world) are quite high. The highest
correlation is between France and Italy (43.2%) and the lowest between France and
12We also estimate our models with 0, 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 lags to calibrate the impact of the lag
selection on our results. No substantial changes in the results, reported later, were observed.
13See Krolzig (1997).
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Denmark (12.1%).14
The assumption implicitly made in the analysis is that the mean jumps instantly
to its new level across regimes. We can relax this assumption, to allow for a smoother
transition to the new level. The specification now becomes
!t = ⌫(rt) +
pX
j=1
Aj(!t j) + ut, (3)
with a representation, again with one lag, of the form
!t =
1X
j=0
Aj1⌫(rt j) +
1X
j=0
Aj1ut j. (4)
It can be seen that shocks here feed into !t through the matrix of estimated co-
e cients. Results are reported in the second panel of Table 2. In comparison to
the model with a one-o↵ shift in the mean, the magnitudes seem to have changed
in several cases, mostly upwards. A characteristic of this model is that the crisis
regime has now become much less persistent. The probability of switching to a tran-
quil state when in a crisis has now increased to 52.3%. The correlations have also
changed in some cases but always remain positive. The particularly high correlation
between France and Italy remains.
5.2 Heteroscedastic MSVARS
We have seen that the countries in our sample face simultaneous positive FX pres-
sures when the regime switches from tranquil to crisis. This is hardly surprising
given the amount of intra-trade between the EMS countries. What is more interest-
ing is to see whether these switches also a↵ect the contemporaneous correlations of
the cross-country MPIs. To perform this estimation we need to relax the assumption
of homoscedasticity. This is a more realistic setting and is further justified since a
14Correlations between the rest of the countries are reported in Table 4, where we compare the
sensitivity of correlations under di↵erent model assumptions, including the homoscedastic case.
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likelihood ratio test rejects the restrictions imposed by the homoscedastic model.
As the variances and covariances vary across regimes we calculate two sets of cor-
relations: one for the tranquil state and one for the crisis state. These correlations
are, however, conditional on the increased volatility associated with crisis incidents
and should not be used directly to make inferences on contagion.
The MSIH(2)-VAR(2) specification delivers a p11 (i.e. remaining in a non-crisis
regime) transition probability of 87.1% whereas the p22 (i.e. remaining in a crisis
regime) transition probability is 52.6%. The respective values for the MSMH(2)-
VAR(2) are 86.2% and 52%. Both specifications deliver a similar duration for regime
1 (7.8 and 7.3 months respectively). Table 3 reports the changes in means caused
by regime shifts in this heteroscedastic setting. Regime 2 is associated with higher
volatility as measured by the standard errors reported.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 4 reports contemporaneous correlations for both regimes and models. It
also shows correlations for a simple non-switching VAR, and the homoscedastic
mean-switching and intercept-switching VARs. Focusing for a moment on these last
three, it can be seen that some correlations seem to be fairly robust to di↵erent
specifications. For example, the coe cient for Italy and France is around 45% in
all three models. Other correlations also appear quite stable, e.g. Belgium and
Denmark, and Ireland and Belgium even though the magnitude of the correlation
coe cient is not as high as for Italy and France. For some countries, though, the
size of the correlations depends on the specification. In general, it tends to be lower
in the MSI model. For example, for the simple VAR the coe cient for Italy and
Belgium is 21%, whereas for the MSI it is just 8%. The first three panels of the
table report results for homoscedastic specifications, in other words the variance is
assumed not to change across regimes. We place more confidence in estimates of
the correlation coe cients derived from heteroscedastic specifications, reported in
the last two panels of Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
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In seven out of ten cases there is an increase in the size of the correlation co-
e cient during regime 2. This result holds irrespective of whether we estimate
a mean-switching or an intercept-switching model. The magnitudes are also very
similar. The most dramatic increases are observed between Belgium and Denmark
(approximately 180%) and France and Italy (approximately 160%). In some cases,
e.g. between France and Denmark, the correlations disappear in regime 2 or even
become negative. Overall, there is evidence of increased correlation in FX pressures
in the EMS during crisis periods. Using fewer lags or an extra one does not alter this
finding. Increasing the memory of the VAR beyond three lags, though, produces
slightly di↵erent correlations.
Figure 2 shows the ‘smoothed’ probabilities of a switch to the crisis regime 2
for the duration of the EMS. Our chosen specification captures well the phases
of the ERM: the volatile first stage (sometimes called the ‘old’ EMS) when there
were 12 realignments, the ‘new’ or ‘hard’ EMS between 1987 and 1992 when only
4 realignments took place and the final stage of speculative attacks during 1993
that induced Britain and Italy to abandon the mechanism and eventually led to its
demise. Comparing the crisis dating depicted in the figure with the actual incidence
of realignments provides us with encouraging results: 12 out of the 18 realignments
plus the shock of the widening of the exchange rate bands in August 1993 are clas-
sified as crisis regimes. The regime classification (and the associated probabilities)
along with the actual realignments are presented in 5.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Table 5 about here]
6 Testing for Contagion
The timing or geographical proximity of crisis incidents do not necessarily indicate
the presence of contagion e↵ects. For example, the reason behind simultaneous
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currency pressures during a crisis state could be a common shock that induces a de-
terioration in the fundamental macroeconomic indicators in the a↵ected economies.
If the shock is unobservable it would be easy to mistake the e↵ects of the distur-
bance for contagion.15 Therefore, one has to disentangle the role of common factors
(international shocks or monsoonal e↵ects) from the international transmission of
country-specific shocks. The latter can be further classified as the e↵ect of spillovers,
if the transmission is through well-established fundamental links, or as contagion, if
the transmission is ‘over and above’ what would be explained by such links, normally
as a result of investor confidence/psychology taking over.
Under this line of thinking, if a shock in country A (which is not common to
country B) induces an increase in volatility in country B (controlling for the two
countries’ fundamental links), the crisis can be classified as displaying contagion
e↵ects. But there are two further complications here: first, the source of the shock
(the ‘origin’ country) needs to be known in advance; second, we need to adjust the
correlations for the fact that they are a positive function of volatility.
Regarding the first issue, we examine the role of Denmark and Italy as the origin
countries. As Eichengreen (2000) suggests, the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by
the Danish voters in June 2, 1991 and the competitiveness problems that Italy had
accumulated over the years may have led to the demise of the ERM. The tests that
follow provide substantial evidence that Denmark exported its volatility to other
EMS countries. The evidence for Italy is less conclusive.
Regarding the second issue, if the cross-market correlation was high before-crisis
then any shock to country A could have implications for country B. This would be
described as interdependence but not as contagion (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
Hence, we need to correct for the e↵ects of heteroscedasticity. If this point is not
addressed, then the increased volatility in one market –a characteristic of a crisis
state– could lead to increased correlations with another market even though the
15These are known in the literature as monsoonal e↵ects, even though the term is mainly asso-
ciated with the e↵ects of major economic shifts in industrial countries on emerging economies –see
Masson (1998).
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underlying transmission mechanism of shocks has not changed.
The ‘unconditional’ (corrected) correlations, as suggested by FR are given by:
⇢U =
⇢Cq
1 +  c  nc nc (1  ⇢2C)
, (5)
where ⇢U is the unconditional correlation, ⇢C is the conditional correlation and   is
the standard deviation of the shock-originating country’s MPI (c denotes the crisis
regime and nc the non-crisis regime). Dungey et al. (2004)16 show that this test
can be extended into a multivariate regression framework by estimating a system of
equations, where for country A (the first equation of the system) we would have
✓
!A,t
 nc,A
◆
=  0A⇤+  
0
A (⇤⌦  t) + ⌫At, (6)
where ! stands for the market pressure index, A is the destination country, t denotes
time,  nc is the standard deviation of the non-crisis observations,   and   are (N  
1)⇥1 vectors of coe cients, matrix ⇤ contains stacked MPI observations (explained
below) scaled by the non-crisis standard deviations ⇤ =
h⇣
!1,t
 nc,1
⌘
...
⇣
!N 1,t
 nc,N 1
⌘i
,  t is
a dummy variable whose value is 1 for the crisis observations and 0 for the non-crisis
observations and ⌫t is an error term. The coe cient estimates contained in  A can
be thought of as the e↵ects of the corresponding regressors in the crisis state on
country A’s pressure index. If there is no change in these e↵ects when the system
is in a crisis state these coe cients should be zero and contagion is not present.
The first equation in our system is for Belgium, and, including an intercept and
a dummy, can be written as
16Dungey et al. (2004) provide a useful summary of contagion tests. Other recent tests include
Corsetti et al. (2005).
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✓
!BEL,t
 nc,BEL
◆
=  0BEL +  
1
BEL t +  BEL,DEN
✓
!DEN,t
 nc,DEN
◆
+ BEL,FRA
✓
!FRA,t
 nc,FRA
◆
+  BEL,IRL
✓
!IRL,t
 nc,IRL
◆
+  BEL,ITA
✓
!ITA,t
 nc,ITA
◆
+ BEL,DEN
✓
!DEN,t
 nc,DEN
◆
 t +  BEL,FRA
✓
!FRA,t
 nc,FRA
◆
 t +  BEL,IRL
✓
!IRL,t
 nc,IRL
◆
 t
+ BEL,ITA
✓
!ITA,t
 nc,ITA
◆
 t + ⌫BEL,t;
the second equation, for Denmark, is
✓
!DEN,t
 nc,DEN
◆
=  0DEN +  
1
DEN t +  DEN,BEL
✓
!BEL,t
 nc,BEL
◆
+ DEN,FRA
✓
!FRA,t
 nc,FRA
◆
+  DEN,IRL
✓
!IRL,t
 nc,IRL
◆
+  DEN,ITA
✓
!ITA,t
 nc,ITA
◆
+ DEN,BEL
✓
!BEL,t
 nc,BEL
◆
 t +  DEN,FRA
✓
!FRA,t
 nc,FRA
◆
 t +  DEN,IRL
✓
!IRL,t
 nc,IRL
◆
 t
+ DEN,ITA
✓
!ITA,t
 nc,ITA
◆
 t + ⌫DEN,t,
etc.
The vector of observations ! contains the non-crisis observations endogenously
selected by the MS-VAR stacked upon the crisis observations. As mentioned before,
both sets of non-crisis and crisis observations are scaled by the standard deviation
of the non-crisis observations. As shown in Dungey et al. (2004) the multivariate
version of the FR test in this regression framework is better placed to detect conta-
gion. In addition, whereas the standard errors of (5) are based on a small sample
asymptotic adjustment, the standard errors of (6) are least squares errors.
We estimate the system of five equations as seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR), a method that controls for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correla-
tion. The results, reported in Table 6, are consistent with the change in correlations
across states in Table 4. As mentioned before, we focus our attention on Denmark,
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whose rejection of the Maastricht Treaty has often been blamed for triggering pes-
simistic market expectations that eventually led to the end of the ERM. Italy’s
competitiveness problems have also been blamed for the instability in the EMS.
Hence, we concentrate on the   coe cients, which we interpret as contagion e↵ects.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The application of the FRM test shows that Denmark was indeed a↵ecting other
countries’ FX markets, as verified by the significant estimated coe cient of 0.981.
Specifically, pressures in Denmark’s FX market appears to trigger pressures in Bel-
gium and Ireland. It is noteworthy that the opposite is not true, i.e. pressures in
Belgium or Ireland do not have a significant e↵ect on Denmark’s MPI movements.
The correlation with France under a crisis regime is negative. Both countries
appear to be influencing each other, but Denmark’s e↵ect is greater in magnitude.
Denmark’s MPI does not seem to a↵ect Italy’s pressure index. It is, however, a↵ected
by it, moving in the opposite direction during a crisis state. Italy also a↵ects France
–and is a↵ected to a lesser extent by it. Wald tests of parameter significance confirm
the above conclusions.
The analysis presented here has implications for portfolio diversification. Risk-
averse investors would like to hold assets whose returns are negatively correlated in a
crisis state. Assuming that MPIs move largely because of movements in currencies,
this property is exhibited between the Italian lira and the Danish krone (for a
shock originating in Italy) and the Danish krone and the French franc (for shocks
originating in any of the two countries). As an example, an investor who diversified
between krone and francs would have limited losses in a crisis state. If, on the other
hand, he/she had holdings in krone and Belgian francs there would have been no
benefit from diversification, as in a crisis state the two currencies were be almost
perfectly positively correlated.
We have then found some evidence of contagion in the exchange rate mechanism
of the EMS, which seems to confirm Eichengreen’s (2000) intuition about the role
of Denmark’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty. The evidence for Italy is slightly
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weaker. A caveat, however, needs to be issued here that the standard errors reported
may have been somewhat a↵ected by the use of the same dataset in what is a two-
step procedure. It should also be noted that the FRM test, while substantially
better than others in the literature, still su↵ers from poor small sample properties.
Dungey et al. (2005) show that the test tends to over-reject the hypothesis of no
contagion.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has used a Markov switching model with fixed transition probabilities
to study FX market pressures and contagion in the ERM. Using a market pressure
indicator for five participant countries and allowing for regime switching and het-
eroscedastic errors, we find that most FX market correlations increase during the
crisis state.
The features of the model are attractive for this kind of analysis. The use of a
continuous crisis variable means that we do not need to choose an arbitrary cut-o↵
point in order to define a crisis. The Markov model allows for a tranquil and a crisis
state and assigns probabilities that the system was in one or the other at a given
month. The chosen specification does well in defining the ERM’s realignments as
crisis states.
We use this endogenous determination of crisis states to implement the Dungey
et al. (2004) multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test to detect
contagion in the EMS. We consider Denmark and Italy as the source countries
(Denmark for rejecting the Maastricht Treaty and Italy because of accumulated
competitiveness problems) and find that the former indeed exported its volatility
Ireland and Belgium. Contagion e↵ects appear to exist between Italy and Denmark
as well. Our findings have potentially important lessons for the design of e cient
portfolios aimed at reducing the risks associated with currency volatility.
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Figure 1: Market Pressure Indexes, 1979–1993
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Figure 2: Smoothed Probabilities of the Crisis Regime
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
BEL DEN FRA IRL ITA NLD
Mean 0.052 0.058 0.026 0.154 0.067 -0.040
Maximum 4.669 4.860 3.167 7.798 4.735 3.028
Minimum -2.085 -3.015 -2.582 -5.689 -2.562 -2.564
St. Deviation 0.797 0.971 0.801 1.549 0.843 0.546
Skewness 0.742 0.681 0.907 1.405 1.044 0.392
Kurtosis 7.070 3.179 3.003 7.010 5.319 7.481
No. of Obs. 191 191 191 191 191 191
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Table 2: Homoscedastic MSM(2)-VAR(2) and MSI(2)-VAR(2)
BEL DEN FRA IRL ITA
µ1 -0.072 -0.321 -0.2 -0.365 -0.168
µ2 0.206 0.524 0.293 0.686 0.335
µ2   µ1 0.278 0.845 0.493 1.051 0.503
⌫1 -0.053 -0.157 -0.036 -0.249 -0.115
⌫2 0.474 1.199 0.273 1.876 0.882
⌫2   ⌫1 0.527 1.356 0.309 2.125 0.997
Notes: Non-linear Markov-switching estimations with regime-dependent means (panel 1) or intercepts (panel 2) and
homoscedastic errors. Order of VAR: 2. Number of regimes: 2. MSM: switching mean – see equation 1 in text.
MSI: switching intercept – see equation 3. Results were obtained using H-M. Krolzig’s MSVAR package for Ox.
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Table 3: Heteroscedastic MSM(2)-VAR(2) and MSI(2)-VAR(2)
BEL DEN FRA IRL ITA
µ1 -0.010 -0.042 -0.093 -0.081 -0.021
µ2 0.31 0.399 0.491 0.576 0.399
µ2   µ1 0.32 0.441 0.584 0.657 0.42
SE1 0.397 0.867 0.445 0.835 0.521
SE2 1.45 1.046 1.27 2.579 1.413
⌫1 -0.012 -0.024 -0.083 -0.092 -0.029
⌫2 0.239 0.355 0.431 0.741 0.339
⌫2   ⌫1 0.251 0.379 0.514 0.833 0.368
SE1 0.399 0.875 0.45 0.86 0.524
SE2 1.486 1.056 1.306 2.607 1.44
Notes: Non-linear Markov-switching estimations with regime-dependent means (panel 1) or intercepts (panel 2) and
heteroscedastic errors. SE: standard error. Order of VAR: 2. Results were obtained using H-M. Krolzig’s MSVAR
package for Ox.
28
Table 4: Correlations
BEL DEN FRA IRL ITA
*simple VAR*
BEL 1
DEN 0.37 1
FRA 0.15 0.27 1
IRL 0.24 0.3 0.23 1
ITA 0.21 0.27 0.45 0.24 1
*MSM*
BEL 1
DEN 0.42 1
FRA 0.12 0.12 1
IRL 0.25 0.18 0.2 1
ITA 0.15 0.2 0.43 0.18 1
*MSI*
BEL 1
DEN 0.32 1
FRA 0.1 0.19 1
IRL 0.18 0.02 0.23 1
ITA 0.08 0.07 0.46 0.01 1
*MSMH*
BEL 1 0.61 0.15 0.35 0.19
DEN 0.22 1 -0.03 0.42 0.14
FRA 0.09 0.43 1 0.2 0.57
IRL 0.07 0.2 0.28 1 0.2
ITA 0.07 0.36 0.22 0.16 1
*MSIH*
BEL 1 0.64 0.17 0.36 0.2
DEN 0.23 1 0.01 0.41 0.17
FRA 0.09 0.44 1 0.22 0.58
IRL 0.11 0.22 0.28 1 0.22
ITA 0.07 0.36 0.22 0.15 1
Notes: For the heteroscedastic mean-switching (MSMH) and intercept-switching (MSIH) specifications, numbers be-
low the main diagonal are regime 1 correlations whereas numbers above the main diagonal are regime 2 correlations.
Order of all VARs: 2. Results were obtained using H-M. Krolzig’s MSVAR package for Ox.
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Table 5: Regime Classification and Actual Realignments
Tranquil Regime 1 Realignment Crisis Regime 2 Realignment
1978:5 - 1978:9 (0.9794) 1978:4 - 1978:4 (0.9940)
1978:11 - 1979:2 (0.9096) 1978:10 - 1978:10 (0.9998)
1979:4 - 1980:3 (0.9649) [2] 1979:3 - 1979:3 (1.0000)
1980:7 - 1981:2 (0.9782) 1980:4 - 1980:6 (0.9985)
1981:8 - 1981:9 (0.9358) 1981:3 - 1981:7 (0.9492) [1]
1981:11 - 1981:11 (0.9848) 1981:10 - 1981:10 (1.0000) [1]
1982:5 - 1982:5 (0.8843) 1981:12 - 1982:4 (0.9548) [1]
1982:7 - 1983:2(0.9166) 1982:6 - 1982:6 (0.9990) [1]
1983:4 - 1984:2 (0.9872) [1] 1983:3 - 1983:3 (1.0000) [1]
1984:4 - 1986:3 (0.9795) [1] 1984:3 - 1984:3 (0.9970)
1986:6 - 1986:6 (0.8345) 1986:4 - 1986:5 (0.9170) [1]
1986:9 - 1986:10 (0.9817) 1986:7 - 1986:8 (0.9337) [1]
1986:12 - 1986:12 (0.8023) 1986:11 - 1986:11 (0.5240)
1987:2 - 1992:5 (0.9852) [1] 1987:1 - 1987:1 (0.9990) [1]
1992:8 - 1992:8 (0.7877) 1992:6 - 1992:7 (1.0000)
1993:2- 1993:2 (0.9383) [1] 1992:9 - 1993:1 (0.9932) [3]
1993:5 - 1993:6 (0.9327) [1] 1993:3 - 1993:4 (0.9982)
1993:9 - 1993:10 (0.9880) 1993:7 - 1993:8 (1.0000) [1]
1993:12 - 1993:12 (0.9469) 1993:11 - 1993:11 (1.0000)
Notes: Regime probabilities are from a MSIH(2)-VAR(2) model. The numbers in brackets indicate the number of
actual realignments.
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Table 6: FRM Regression Results
BEL DEN FRA IRL ITA
Constant 0.022 0.053 -0.15 -0.031 0.037
(0.126) (0.075) (0.108) (0.123) (0.103)
  -0.347 0.054 0.519** 0.369 -0.188
(0.305) (0.179) (0.261) (0.296) (0.25)
 BEL – 0.27* 0.004 0.124 0.043
– (0.072) (0.111) (0.123) (0.104)
 DEN 0.559* – 0.41* 0.275** 0.291*
(0.135) – (0.115) (0.136) (0.111)
 FRA -0.104 0.365* – 0.167 0.313*
(0.138) (0.077) – (0.133) (0.105)
 IRL 0.12 0.129*** 0.172 – 0.057
(0.128) (0.076) ( 0.111) – (0.105)
 ITA 0.009 0.267* 0.383* 0.086 –
(0.13) (0.075) (0.106) (0.127) –
 BEL – 0.014 0.021 -0.084 0.023
– (0.084) (0.135) (0.15) (0.126)
 DEN 0.981* – -0.542* 0.597** -0.118
(0.236) – (0.231) (0.254) (0.219)
 FRA 0.188 -0.362* – -0.029 0.348*
(0.173) (0.098) – (0.167) (0.126)
 IRL -0.074 0.038 -0.074 – 0.013
(0.157) (0.091) (0.136) – (0.129)
 ITA 0.138 -0.242** 0.438** 0.009 –
(0.177) (0.103) (0.135) (0.173) –
Notes: The table provides SUR estimates of a system of equations, where each equation has the form of (6) in the
text. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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